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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in case number 
990558-CA pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (1996) . The Utah 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of case number 990235-CA by order 
of the Utah Supreme Court, dated April 28, 1999, transferring the 
case to this court. The two cases have been consolidated pursuant 
to an order of this court dated August 27, 1999. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting the Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment where the Plaintiff was not required by 
Utah law to attach copies of the pages of the depositions to which 
she referred in her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment to that document. 
The trial court's ruling granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment appears at pages 0177-0175 in the Record. 
As in any appeal involving only a question of law, this court 
reviews the trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment 
by applying the same standard applicable in the trial court. 
English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 848 
P. 2d 153 (Utah 1993) . Thus, this court does not defer to the trial 
court's determination of whether there are disputed material facts 
but instead reviews the facts and inferences in the light most 
1 
favorable to the losing party, resolves any doubts or uncertainties 
in the favor of that party, and determines whether a genuine 
question of material fact was presented. Career Service Review 
Board v. Utah Department of Corrections, 942 P.2d 933 (Utah 1997); 
Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991); 
Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in granting the Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment where the evidence contained in the 
deposition pages attached by the Defendant to its Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of the Summary Judgment Motion 
and its Reply Memorandum established that a material question of 
fact as to the Defendant's negligence existed. Similarly, whether 
the trial court erred where it was undisputed that the woman 
Freeman saw talking to the store manager was not the Plaintiff and 
thus Plaintiff was not required to provide evidentiary support for 
that fact. 
The trial court's ruling granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment appears at pages 0177-0175 in the Record. 
As in any appeal involving only a question of law, this court 
reviews the trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment 
by applying the same standard applicable in the trial court. 
English v. Kienke, 774- P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 848 
P. 2d 153 (Utah 1993) . Thus, this court does not defer to the trial 
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court's determination of whether there are disputed material facts. 
Instead, this court reviews the facts and inferences in the light 
most favorable to the losing party, resolves any doubts or 
uncertainties in the favor of that party, and determines whether a 
genuine question of material fact was presented. Career Service 
Review Board v. Utah Department of Corrections, 942 P.2d 933 (Utah 
1997); Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 
1991); Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) . 
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing 
to grant Plaintiff's motion under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) where 
Plaintiff's failure to attach copies of deposition pages on which 
she relied in her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment was based on a reasonable reading of the plain 
language of controlling Utah authority and where the absence of the 
copies did not in any way prejudice the Defendant. 
The trial court's ruling denying Plaintiff's motion under Rule 
60(b) appears at page 0211 in the Record. 
This court reviews a trial court's decision on a motion under 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) for an abuse of discretion. See Larsen v. 
Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984). 
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CONTROLLING RULES 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e): 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense 
required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be 
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to 
the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of 
all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit 
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court 
may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made 
and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party 
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he 
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, 
shall be entered against him. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b): 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; 
newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and 
upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; 
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based 
has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for 
reasons (1), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after 
the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. 
A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the 
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This 
rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, 
order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud 
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief 
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from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 5(a) (1) : 
(a) Service: When required. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules or 
as otherwise directed by the court, every judgment, every 
order required by its terms to be served, every pleading 
subsequent to the original complaint, every paper 
relating to discovery, every written motion other than 
one which may be heard ex parte, and every written 
notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, and 
similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 5(d): 
(d) Filing. Except where rules of judicial 
administration prohibit the filing of discovery requests 
and responses, all papers after the complaint required to 
be served upon a party shall be filed with the court 
either before or within a reasonable time after service. 
The papers shall be accompanied by a certificate of 
service showing the date and manner of service completed 
by the person effecting service. 
Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-501(1) (A): 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(A) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, 
except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be 
accompanied by a memorandum of points and authorities 
appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by 
page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits 
or other documents relied upon in support of the motion. 
Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion shall not 
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the "statement of 
material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as 
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If 
an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length 
memorandum, the application shall state the length of the 
principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is in excess 
of ten pages, the application shall include a summary of 
the memorandum, not to exceed five pages. 
5 
Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-501(2) (B): 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The 
points and authorities in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains 
a concise statement of material facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed 
fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and 
shall specifically refer to those portions of the record 
upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, 
shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the 
movant's facts that are disputed. All material facts set 
forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by 
an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless 
specifically controverted by the opposing party's 
statement. 
Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-502(4): 
(4) Depositions taken pursuant to the Rules of 
Civil Procedure shall not be filed with the clerk of the 
court except as provided in this Code or upon order of 
the court for good cause shown. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 30 (f) (1) : 
(f) Record of deposition; certification and 
delivery by officer; exhibits; copies. 
(1) The transcript or other recording of the 
deposition made in accordance with this rule shall be the 
record of the deposition. The officer shall sign a 
certificate, to accompany the record of the deposition, 
that it was duly sworn and that it is a true record of 
the testimony given by the witness. Unless otherwise 
ordered by the court, the officer shall securely seal the 
record of the deposition in an envelope endorsed with the 
title of the action and marked "Deposition of [here 
insert name of 'witness] " and shall promptly send the 
sealed record to be made. If any party in the action is 
not represented by an attorney, the record of the 
deposition shall be sent to the clerk of the court for 
filing unless otherwise ordered by the court. An 
attorney receiving the record of the deposition shall 
store it under conditions that will protect it against 
loss, destruction, tampering, or deterioration. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arose from a fall Plaintiff suffered while she was 
shopping in Defendant's store in Orem, Utah. Plaintiff fell on 
liquid soap which had apparently spilled onto the floor from a 
bottle in the shopping cart of another customer. Defendant filed 
a motion for summary judgment, arguing that there was no evidence 
that it had constructive notice of the spilled soap for a 
sufficient time before Plaintiff fell for it to have cleaned the 
spill and thereby prevented the fall. 
The trial court granted Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (See R. at 1077-1075.) In his Memorandum Decision, 
Judge Ray M. Harding stated that he would not consider Plaintiff's 
arguments that certain facts were in dispute because Plaintiff had 
not attached copies of the pages of the depositions on which she 
relied to her opposing Memorandum. (See R. at 1076.) The trial 
court raised this matter sua sponte. 
Plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the order granting 
summary judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). (See R. at 
0179.) The trial court denied the Plaintiff's motion. (See R. at 
0211.) Plaintiff's notice of appeal from the order granting 
summary judgment was filed on May 26, 1999. (See R. at 0189.) 
That appeal was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. (See R. at 0254.) The appellate court number in 
that matter is 990235-CA. (See R. at 0255.) 
The two appeals were consolidated by Order dated August 27, 
1999. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Dee Blain was injured when she fell on a foreign 
substance on the floor of the Defendant's store while she was 
shopping. After she fell, Plaintiff remained on the floor for 10 
to 15 minutes after she became aware of what was going on after the 
fall. (R. at 0083.) Plaintiff does not know if she lost 
consciousness when she fell but states that she "was stunned or 
something because" she does not remember hitting the floor. (R. at 
0085.) 
Plaintiff's daughter, Sheri Anderson, who was shopping with 
her, heard a Wal-Mart employee state that the substance on which 
her mother fell had been spilled from the back of the store, which 
occupied 110,000 square feet, to the front of the store. (R. at 
0079.) She heard that statement a minute or so after her mother 
fell. (R. at 0079.) The statement was made while two female Wal-
Mart employees, Anderson, and Troy Guevara, a Wal-Mart manager, 
were standing around Plaintiff, who remained on the floor. (R. at 
0079.) 
Melia Lei 0'Hawaii White Freeman, the Wal-Mart employee who 
cleaned up the spill, was working in one of the store aisles when 
she saw a couple of spots on the floor. (R. at 0074.) She grabbed 
some paper towels and wiped up the spots that she saw. (R. at 
0074.) As she wiped up those spots, she saw more spots. (R. at 
0073.) This pattern continued until she reached the place where 
she believed Plaintiff had fallen. (R. at 0073.) When she reached 
the place where she believed Plaintiff had fallen, a store manager 
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was already there. (R. at 0073.) Freeman stated that, when she 
turned the corner from the aisle where she had been working and 
entered the main aisle in which Plaintiff had fallen, she saw that 
the spill "was something more than a couple little drops. But I 
had no idea." (R. at 0072.) Freeman testified that the drops she 
followed from the area in which she was originally working to the 
place where Plaintiff had fallen were part of the same spill. (R. 
at 0071.) Freeman also testified that it was "quite a ways" from 
the place where she first noticed the drops to the place where the 
Plaintiff fell. (R. at 0070.) She also stated that the area in 
which the spill occurred was a high traffic area. (R. at 0068.) 
Freeman stated that frequently a spill will first be noticed 
by a customer, who will ask a Wal-Mart employee to clean it up. 
(R. at 0119.) Freeman stated that the instructions given to Wal-
Mart employees regarding cleaning up spills were that the employee 
who found the spill should clean it up, or call to another Wal-Mart 
employee to clean it, or have a customer go get another employee. 
(R. at 0119.) Freeman testified that she would not leave a spill 
that had not been cleaned up. (R. at 0119.) On the day Plaintiff 
was injured, Freeman did not see any other employees as she was 
cleaning up the spill. (R. at 0119.) 
When she was asked whether she requested a customer to summon 
another Wal-Mart employee to help with the spill, Freeman 
responded, "I didn't feel that it was necessary because I had the 
paper towels and it wasn't that—that great of a spill." (R. at 
0118.) She further explained, "And if I—if I conversed with a 
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customer, then I probably would have gotten swarmed by some more 
customers asking me for something. Customers are always looking 
for somebody to help them. So I just stayed content on cleaning up 
what I could see." (R. at 0118.) She also stated: 
I may have even taken my smock off to clean it up so that 
nobody even knew I was a employee to stop me. 
Q. Is that- something you would do now and then to 
avoid that problem? 
A. Sometimes, yeah, like if you had to get to do 
something. But I usually kept it in my back pocket. I 
never hid it. It was always there, and the employees 
knew who I was so—[.] 
(R. at 0118.) 
Freeman's testimony regarding the scene when she reached the 
area in which the manager was standing is as follows: 
Q. All right. Let me take you to that point for 
a moment. You mentioned to us as you came around the 
corner of that last aisle you saw—I guess you saw my 
client on the floor? 
A. Yeah. Well, no, I didn't see her on the floor. 
I saw her standing up. 
Q. All right. 
A. I got around the corner when she was standing 
there and talking to the manager. 
Q. But you were able to put together that she had 
fallen on the material? 
A. Yeah. Something—yeah. Something had happened 
for there to be a manager. 
(R. at 0127.) 
Freeman testified that she believed that the customer she saw 
talking to the manager was the same person who had caused the 
spill. Freeman thought she was also the person who had fallen and 
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been injured. (R. at 0126-0125.) Freeman stated that she saw this 
woman only when the woman was standing and talking to the manager. 
(R. at 0125.) Freeman.did not see her in any other position. (R. 
at 0125.) Freeman testified that, once she approached the manager 
and the woman, she saw a dripping bottle in the woman's shopping 
basket. (R. at 0123.) 
The Wal-Mart manager who spoke with Plaintiff immediately 
after she fell was Troy Guevara. He stated that the liquid on 
which the Plaintiff fell had come from a bottle which had been 
placed in a shopping cart by a customer who left a trail of liquid 
all through the store. (R. at 0147.) Guevara testified as 
follows: 
A. Well, I remember later, whoever it was that 
came up said, "Troy, I followed that thing all the way 
around the store." 
Q. Okay. 
A. And I said, "Wow, that's a pretty good spill." 
(R. at 0145.) Guevara also testified that the spill was located in 
areas which Wal-Mart employees cross over "every five minutes or 
so." (R. at 0143.) He testified that he would have expected the 
employees to see the spill when they crossed the areas in which it 
was located. (R. at 0143.) 
The pertinent portion of the trial judge's opinion is as 
follows: 
Plaintiff argues that it is disputed whether 
Defendant had knowledge of the spill before her fall 
since she testified in her deposition that she was still 
lying on the floor when she talked to Mr. Guevara and 
because Ms. Freeman's description in her deposition of 
the person she found standing and talking to Mr. Guevara 
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was obviously of another woman. However, the Court 
cannot consider these arguments since Plaintiff did not 
provide the Court with a copy of the portions of the 
depositions which allegedly contain these statements. 
[W]hen a party opposes a properly supported 
motion for summary judgment and fails to file 
any responsive affidavits or other evidentiary 
materials allowed by Rule 56 (e), the trial 
court may properly conclude that there are no 
genuine issues of fact unless the face of the 
movant's affidavit affirmatively discloses the 
existence of such an issue. Without such a 
showing, the Court need only decide whether, 
on the basis of the applicable law, the moving 
party is entitled to judgment. Franklin 
Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 
P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983). 
(R. at 0176-0175.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff contends that the trial judge erred by ruling that 
he could not consider evidence contained on the pages of 
depositions to which the Plaintiff cited in her Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment because 
copies of those pages were not attached to that Memorandum. The 
plain language of several Utah rules establishes that copies do not 
have to be attached to documents such as Plaintiff's Memorandum. 
Nothing in the only case relied upon by the trial judge in support 
of his ruling or in the cases cited by the Defendant in support of 
that ruling in the briefings below support the judge's position. 
Thus, the trial judge erred in refusing to consider the evidence 
relied upon by the Plaintiff. 
Furthermore, the trial judge ignored the fact that many of the 
pages referred to by the Plaintiff were also cited by the Defendant 
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in its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment and its Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
Defendant did provide copies of the pages to which it cited to the 
trial judge, and thus those pages were before the court. Plaintiff 
contends that, even if only the deposition pages referred to by the 
Defendant are considered, a material question of fact as to the 
Defendant's negligence is raised. 
The Defendant has never claimed the woman Freeman saw talking 
to Troy Guevara was both the customer who caused the spill and the 
Plaintiff. Thus, there was no need for Plaintiff to present 
support for her contention that she was not the person Freeman saw 
talking to Guevara. The Defendant did not contest Plaintiff's 
statement that the description Freeman gave of the Plaintiff was 
clearly not the Plaintiff. In other words, the identity of the 
woman Freeman saw talking to Guevara was not contested. Plaintiff 
did not need to offer any support for her contention that she was 
not the woman Freeman saw talking to Guevara. (See Utah R. Jud. 
Admin. 4-501(2)(B) (requiring specific references to record in 
support of disputed facts)). 
Plaintiff contends that the trial judge abused his discretion 
in failing to grant Plaintiff's motion under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
Recognizing that this court will rarely reverse a trial judge's 
decision because of an abuse of discretion, Plaintiff nevertheless 
contends that the exacting standard necessary for obtaining relief 
is met in this case. Several factual aspects of this case support 
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Plaintiff's position. First, Plaintiff contends that her reading 
of Utah law, which led her to believe that she was not required to 
attach copies of the deposition pages which she cited in her 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
was, at the very least, reasonable. 
Furthermore, Defendant suffered no prejudice whatsoever from 
the absence of the page copies. Indeed, Defendant did not even 
object to the absence of the copies. The trial judge raised the 
matter sua sponte. The fact that Defendant used portions of the 
same depositions in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment 
illustrates that the Defendant had access to the depositions. If 
Defendant believed that Plaintiff had misrepresented any of the 
contents of the depositions, Defendant certainly would have called 
such alleged misrepresentations to the attention of the trial court 
before the Motion for Summary Judgment was ruled upon. Defendant 
never disputed any of the factual contentions which the Plaintiff 
made and supported with references to the depositions. Thus, even 
if the trial judge were correct in ruling that he could not 
consider matters which were not supported by copies of deposition 
pages, summary judgment was improper in this case and the motion 
for relief under Rule 60(b) should have been granted. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. THE PLAINTIFF WAS NOT REQUIRED TO 
ATTACH TO HER MEMORANDUM COPIES OF THE 
DEPOSITION PAGES TO WHICH SHE REFERRED IN HER 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO THAT 
DOCUMENT. 
This appeal arose from the trial court's ruling that it would 
not consider the Plaintiff's arguments that a factual question had 
been raised by the depositions because Plaintiff did not attach 
copies of the pages of the depositions on which she relied to her 
opposing Memorandum. (See R. at 0176-0175.) Plaintiff contends 
that she was not required to attach copies to her memorandum. 
Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-501(1) (A) (emphasis added) provides: 
All motions . . . shall be accompanied by a memorandum of 
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies 
of or citations by page number to relevant portions of 
depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in 
support of the motion.1 
(Emphasis added). Furthermore, Rule 4-501(2) (B) states: 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The 
points and authorities in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains 
a concise statement of material facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed 
fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and 
shall specifically refer to those portions of the record 
upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, 
]By its terms, Rule 4-501 (1)(A) applies only to motions and memoranda in support 
thereof. Opposing memoranda are addressed in Rule 4-501(1 )(B) which states that 
f,[t]he responding party shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service 
of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting 
documentation." Plaintiff recognizes that the "supporting documentation" referred to 
in (1)(B) is defined by (1)(A) and thus the requirements applicable to memoranda in 
opposition correspond to those for memoranda in support. 
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shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the 
movant's facts that are disputed. All material facts set 
forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by 
an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless 
specifically controverted by the opposing party's 
statement. 
(Emphasis added.) This Rule clearly indicates that references to 
the record are sufficient to support the party's position. 
Photocopies of the relevant pages are not required to be attached 
to the document. 
Plaintiff's research has discovered no authority requiring 
that copies of the deposition pages be attached to the Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Furthermore, the single authority relied upon by the trial court in 
support of its ruling does not address this issue. See Franklin 
Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983) . 
The portion of the opinion in Franklin Financial which the trial 
judge quoted in his Memorandum Decision states that "[w]hen a party 
opposes a properly supported motion for summary judgment and fails 
to file any responsive affidavits or other evidentiary materials" 
the court may conclude' there are no genuine issues of fact unless 
the moving party's supporting evidence discloses such an issue. 
Id. at 1044. That statement fits the facts of Franklin Financial: 
The party opposing the motion for summary judgment did not file a 
memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. See 
id. However, those facts are simply not present in this case. The 
Plaintiff here filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (See R. at 0113-0104.) Furthermore, 
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each factual statement in the memorandum was followed by a specific 
reference to the deposition in which the asserted fact appeared. 
(See R. at 0112-0109.) Each of those references included the page 
of the deposition on which the asserted fact appeared. (See R. at 
0112-0109.) 
Judge Harding's memorandum decision could be read to have a 
different meaning than that discussed above. Judge Harding ruled 
he could not consider Plaintiff's arguments because Plaintiff "did 
not provide the Court with a copy of the portions of the 
depositions which allegedly contained these statements." (See R. 
at 0176.) The excerpt from Franklin Financial on which Judge 
Harding relied, however, refers to the filing of responsive 
affidavits or other evidentiary materials. Thus, it is possible 
that Judge Harding was indicating that his ruling was based on the 
fact that the depositions in this case had not been filed. Any 
such ruling, however, would clearly be erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 
5(a)(1) establishes that "except as otherwise provided in these 
rules" every paper relating to discovery is to be served. Rule 
5(d) establishes that "[e]xcept when the rules of judicial 
administration prohibit the filing of discovery requests and 
responses, all papers after the complaint required to be served 
upon a party shall be filed with the court." Thus, in its 
entirety, Rule 5 establishes that discovery matters are to be filed 
with the court except where such filing is prohibited by the Rules 
of Judicial Administration. 
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Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-502(4) states: 
Depositions taken pursuant to the Rules of Civil 
Procedure shall not be filed with the clerk of court 
except as provided in this Code or upon order of the 
court for good cause shown. 
No order requiring the filing of depositions had been entered in 
this case. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 30(f)(1) states: 
(f) Record of deposition; certification and 
delivery by officer; exhibits; copies. 
(1) The transcript or other recording of the 
deposition made in accordance with this rule shall be the 
record of the deposition. The officer shall sign a 
certificate, to 'accompany the record of the deposition, 
that it was duly sworn and that it is a true record of 
the testimony given by the witness. Unless otherwise 
ordered by the court, the officer shall securely seal the 
record of the deposition in an envelope endorsed with the 
title of the action and marked "Deposition of [here 
insert name of witness]" and shall promptly send the 
sealed record to be made. If any party in the action is 
not represented by an attorney, the record of the 
deposition shall be sent to the clerk of the court for 
filing unless otherwise ordered by the court. An 
attorney receiving the record of the deposition shall 
store it under conditions that will protect it against 
loss, destruction, tampering, or deterioration. 
In plain language, this Rule establishes that, unless the court 
orders otherwise, deposition transcripts are to be safely stored by 
the attorney who ordered the transcript. 
In short, the depositions were filed with the court but stored 
by the attorney. 
An overlapping issue in this case is the fact that a party 
opposing summary judgment is not required to proffer affidavits or 
other supporting evidence in order to avoid an entry of summary 
18 
Atkin, Wright ~ M ;:<£-'-. Chartered, 681 i-. 2^ . 12-! ' :«:: : :<B4 Cn- II 
v. Clark, Cr f T> rd ' :Ti -• * " - '• ' - " J ' ' 
Hame C*. IL . , ~.~u ^:, , - . 
Here, it; was undisputed that: the woman described by Freeman as 
standing rn~!' -,"':|'?1 * ' ' " ! > . ' : : * e'" 
no affidavit ..-r other tvidence was needed to verify this undisputed 
fact. 
Defendant: has ne^ rex clad i i ted tl lat P] a i nti ff was ti le w« :>i nai i 1: 1 : 
had spilled the soap. Defendant did not. contest: Plainti:: s 
argument that Freeman's descriot i or, o^ the Pisintrff was, ^ v' 
. \.<-j . : i . .'..-. • = ,:t„ .. rgL'-iion: exisos n:ian :rec: ."in 
witnessed a conversation between Guevara \ store manager/ and the 
customer who caused the spi ] ] 
: ? uncontested that : J W i n t i f f fel ] in the front of f-he 
store.. Freeman ran upon the customer who spilled the soap in * ne 
front, of the store . Freemai i had cl eaned the spi ] ] , starting at: tl le 
back, of the store. Tl IUS, the customer had made the spill from the 
back of the store to the front of the store. 
B y t h e t :i i i: i e F r e e n i a n c a. m e i :i. p o n 11 i e :;: i i s t o n i. e :i : 1 1 i a L t 1 i a d s p i ] 1 B :i 
the soap, she and the manager were already talking. 
Freeman testified i t took her several minutes to clean up the 
spi] 1 af tei si le sa\ / :i t Gi le v ai: a test if :i ed ernp] oyees woi i] d ];: a .ss 
over the area where the spill was located every five minutes. 
The s e f a c t s together p r o v i de amp I e b a s i s f o r a j i 11: ] !:  c 
questi oi i tl le i easonableness of the Defendant's behavior. 
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This case involves circumstantial evidence. A Utah jury can 
find negligence on the part of the Defendant based strictly on 
circumstantial evidence. Even a criminal verdict, based on the 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, can be based on 
circumstantial evidence. John Q. Hammons, Inc. v. Poletis, 954 
P.2d 1353 (Wyo 1998) and Lohse v. Faultner, 860 P.2d 1306 (Az 
1992) . 
In short, controlling Utah authority establishes that 
Plaintiff was not required to attach copies of the deposition pages 
on which she relied to her memorandum. This court is not required 
to grant any deference to a trial court's legal conclusions and, 
thus, such conclusions are reviewed merely for correctness. See 
Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Finally, the evidence reviewed in the light most favorable to the 
Plaintiff clearly raises a jury question. Thus, this court should 
hold that the trial court erred in stating that the Plaintiff was 
required to attach copies of the deposition pages on which she 
relied to her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Furthermore, it should be remembered that the trial court 
raised this issue sua sponte; Wal-Mart did not object to the 
absence of the copies. After Plaintiff filed her Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant 
Wal-Mart filed a Memorandum in Reply to that document. (See R. at 
0167.) Defendant's document addressed only the substantive issues 
involved in this case; Wal-Mart did not in any way object to 
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P t a i nt i f f J ri t . i h n . " I -i1 " i 'h " t ^ i t r -f M i " d e p o s i ' i ' M [ .iq*jt^ n 
which she relied to her memorandum. 
If Defendant bel i ved rb- + T~d3"^f ; f f "-id misrepresented an^ '.f 
the deposition test:: : •- ,...-. 
have been expected t * :idve called that ,-isrepresentaticr. re\ * ie 
attention of the cc-;" :: t '•, "'•:iricr";v r^ ^ t P.^ r^ " to ria:'":'; ' " r 
Memorandum in Opposi:, .. '.., .*, ,L..„II I-^ I .^ i . ~:.: . .. : ;xent . I" :,J..:_ 
cou'd easily have provided copies of the deposition pages to I ie 
D*"- f - Mii.' a bsc - • • JL 
f actua A. misrepresentation strongly indicated. t:iat L\. i.enc-^ nt 
recognized rhat Plaint.iff accurately represented the deposition 
Defendant recognized that. the identification of •: he wonat Freeman 
saw falkdnc "-"•• Gii^/ar3 was nor Dee Blain ;:uid, thus, Plaintiff was 
n>_ •'. . - _[u . J. e . • •..:. \. ; y si lppoi t f :)i tl: :i :ii s fact. 
Only after the trial court based its summary judgment, run * ::g 
on the absence m e copies did Wal-Mart Mopt r^ he :ouw 's 
position. In Its Memorandum, in Opposition . . -_* r. * , •- e 
60(b) Motion for Relief from. Order, Defendant argued that P.air.t. ft 
w •• MJ ' vv-1 : • ' •• >pj e s tc • hei: memorandi n: i: it. .See R. at 
02 v.  : . • :- La-jLiiLifi sL r-nuuudi 7 contei ids tl lat by failing ^^ have 
raised this issue before summary judgment was granted, Defendant 
w
 s i d ; Ix•:: , :;;]I L, , , . ,,..^ , « , , L of the absei Ice of 11 ie pag : op , s . 
The logic of this position is clear : If Wal-Mart had objected 
before the matter was decided by the trii al judge, the Plainti ff 
coi il d easi ly 1 la v e suppl led tl ie copies B] fa: 1 :i i lg It :> o b j ec .t ,f \ 7 a 1 
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Mart deprived Plaintiff of the ability to correct the matter by the 
simple method of amending her Memorandum in Opposition. It is 
inherently unfair for Defendant to object to the absence of the 
copies when it did not do so at a time when the matter could have 
been easily corrected. 
Despite its lengthy discussion of this issue in the briefings 
in the court below, Defendant Wal-Mart did not cite a single 
authority for the premise that a litigant who cites to deposition 
testimony in a memorandum is required to append copies of 
deposition pages on which she relies to memoranda submitted to the 
court. Instead, the authority on which Wal-Mart relied involved 
situations in which the litigants failed to provide any support 
whatsoever for their positions. Defendant fails to recognize that 
Plaintiff herein did provide support for her assertions; she 
provided that support by referring to the proper pages in the 
depositions, as authorized by Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-501(1) (A). 
Thus, authorities addressing situations in which litigants did not 
respond or present any argument to the court are simply irrelevant 
here. 
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II. 1!0UKI ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. THE 
EVIDENCE CONTAINED IN THE DEPOSITION PAGES 
WHICH THE DEFENDANT SUPPLIED TO TEE TRIAL 
COURT RAISES A MATERIAL QUESTION OF FACT AS TO 
THE DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE, 
Assuming arguendo that copies of deposition pages cited i n a 
litigant's "'^ r.iorard^ ir to tl.]*:- ^ ourt ^ho-Di r-- atnacheo 
judgment. The evidence which was befcie tne court, establishes :.nat 
a material question 01 fact :^- -~ * V Defendant's negliqence '•••~° 
raisec :.•'/ tne sviacnce contains i: . .-c ueposiiion pages 
the Defendant relied. It. is w i l established that a mo; ion or 
E - : ••?•• \ryy\ ••-^ • •' ,:-. •' ,-•/] - -I ear iroui ' he 
unaisputed faces that the party apposing L.I^ a^iion cannot prevail. 
See Lach ileseret Bank, 1AC P.. 2d 802 •••'/ ^ i: C\. . Apr,. ]--•'; 'n 
evaluate ai •. the evidence ana ail reasonable inferences wihcn -ay 
fairly be drawn from *~h^ evidence in uiiu o.i.^ iAL mObi favorable to 
tn,. :.c:;:x7ii::; pai" 
Litigants must be able to present their cases fully to 
the court before judgment can be rendered against them 
unless it is obvious from the evidence before the court 
that the party opposing judgment can establish no right 
to recovery. The trial court must not weigh evidence ox 
assess credibility. 
Mountain States icjiepncne 6c ielegraph Co, v Atkin, Wright & Mi les, 
Chartered, 661 P. 2d at 1261 (footnote omit-t-.v.: • ; see also Wcbstei v. 
c 
k. 
foi summai / judgment may not we.. •.. •.•• evidence or c.Sb-ss 
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credibility). Any doubt regarding whether a nonmovant has 
established a genuine issue of material fact should be resolved in 
favor of permitting the party to go to trial. Butterfield v. 
Okubo, 831 P. 2d 97 (Utah 1992) . A genuine question of fact exists 
when reasonable minds could differ on whether the Defendant's 
conduct satisfied the required standard. Jackson v. Dabney, 645 
P.2d 613 (Utah 1982) . 
On appeal from an order granting summary judgment, the 
appellate court does not defer to the trial court's determination 
of whether there are disputed material facts. Instead, it reviews 
the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the losing 
party and resolves any doubts or uncertainties in the favor of that 
party. Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc. By definition, cases decided 
on summary judgment involve only questions of law, not questions of 
fact. Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 
1991). Thus, only conclusions of law are presented for appellate 
review, and the appellate court is not required to grant any 
deference to the conclusions reached below. Career Service Review 
Board v. Utah Department of Corrections, 942 P.2d 933 (Utah 1997); 
Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc. Instead, the standard for 
review by an appellate court is the same as it was for the trial 
court. English v. Kienke, 114 P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), 
aff'd, 848 P. 2d 153 (Utah 1993) . If the appellate court determines 
that a question of fact exists, the summary judgment will be 
reversed and the case remanded. Id. Summary judgment is 
particularly inappropriate in negligence actions. Id. 
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[S]ummary judgment should be granted with great caution 
where negligence is alleged. Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. 
Cheney, 706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985). This is because 
"[i]ssues of negligence ordinarily present questions of 
fact to be resolved by the fact finder." Id. "It is 
only when the facts are undisputed and but one reasonable 
conclusion can be drawn therefrom that such issues become 
questions of law." Id. Accordingly, summary judgment is 
reserved for only the most clear-cut negligence cases. 
774 P.2d at 1156. 
The trial judge appears to have ignored the fact that many of 
the pages relied upon by the Plaintiff in her opposing Memorandum 
were also cited by the Defendant in its Memoranda. Thus, the court 
had copies of the pertinent deposition pages. The Plaintiff 
strenuously contends that the facts contained in the deposition 
pages attached to the Defendant's Trial Memoranda, and the 
inferences fairly drawn from those facts, raise a material question 
of fact regarding the Defendant's negligence. 
The testimony of the Plaintiff contained in deposition pages 
attached to Defendant's memorandum establishes the following. 
Plaintiff remained on the floor for 10 to 15 minutes after she 
became aware of what was going on after the fall. (R. at 0083.) 
Plaintiff does not know if she lost consciousness when she fell, 
but states that she "was stunned or something because" she does not 
remember hitting the floor. (R. at 0085.) 
The deposition testimony of Plaintiff's daughter, Sheri 
Anderson, contained in the Defendant's Trial Memoranda establishes 
that Anderson heard a Wal-Mart employee state that the substance on 
which her mother fell had been spilled from the back of the store 
to the front of the store. (R. at 0079.) She heard that statement 
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a minute or so after her mother fell. (R. at 0079.) The statement 
was made while two female Wal-Mart employees, as well as Anderson, 
and Troy Guevara were standing around Plaintiff, who remained on 
the floor. (R. at 0073.) 
Defendant's Trial Memoranda also contained excerpts from Melia 
Lei 0'Hawaii White Freeman, the Wal-Mart employee who cleaned up 
the spill. That evidence showed Freeman was working in one of the 
store aisles when she saw a couple of spots on the floor. (R. at 
0074.) She grabbed some paper towels and wiped up the spots that 
she saw. (R. at 0074.) As she wiped up those spots, she saw one 
or two more spots. (R. at 0073.) She stated that this pattern 
continued until she reached the place where Plaintiff had fallen. 
(R. at 0073.) When she reached the place where Plaintiff had 
fallen, a store manager was already there. (R. at 0073.) Freeman 
stated that when she turned the corner from the aisle where she had 
been working and entered the main aisle in which Plaintiff had 
fallen she saw that the spill "was something more than a couple 
little drops. But I had no idea." (R. at 0072.) Freeman 
testified that the drops she followed from the area in which she 
was originally working to the place where Plaintiff had fallen were 
part of the same spill. (R. at 0071.) Freeman also testified that 
it was "quite a ways" from the place where she first noticed the 
drops to the place where the Plaintiff fell. (R. at 0070.) She 
also stated that the area in which the spill occurred was a high 
traffic area. (R. at 0068.) Freeman did not see any other 
employees while she was cleaning up the spill. (R. at 0119.) 
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Freeman stated that frequently a spill will first be noticed by a 
customer, who asks a Wal-Mart employee to clean up. (R. at 0119.) 
Freeman stated that the instructions given to Wal-Mart employees 
regarding cleaning up spills were that the employee who found the 
spill should clean it up, or call to another Wal-Mart employee to 
clean it, or to have a customer go get another employee. (R. at 
0119.) Freeman did not see any other Wal-Mart employees as she was 
cleaning up the spill. (R. at 0119.) When she was asked whether 
she requested a customer to summon another Wal-Mart employee to 
help with the spill, Freeman responded, "I didn't feel that it was 
necessary because I had the paper towels and it wasn't that—that 
great of a spill." (R. at 0118.) She further explained, "And if 
I—if I conversed with a customer, then I probably would have gotten 
swarmed by some more customers asking me for something. Customers 
are always looking for somebody to help them. So I just stayed 
content on cleaning up what I could see." (R. at 0118.) She also 
stated: 
I may have even taken my smock off to clean it up so that 
nobody even knew I was a employee to stop me. 
Q. Is that something you would do now and then to 
avoid that problem? 
A. Sometimes, yeah, like if you had to get to do 
something. But I usually kept it in my back pocket. I 
never hid it. It was always there, and the employees 
knew who I was so —[.] 
(R. at 0118.) 
Freeman's testimony regarding the scene when she reached the 
area in which the manager was standing is as follows: 
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Q. All right. Let me take you to that point for 
a moment. You mentioned to us as you came around the 
corner of the last aisle you saw—I guess you saw my 
client on the floor? 
A. Yeah. Well, no, I didn't see her on the floor. 
I saw her standing up. 
Q. All right. 
A. I got around the corner when she was standing 
there and talking to the manager. 
Q. But you were able to put together that she had 
fallen on the material? 
A. Yeah. Something—yeah. Something had happened 
for there to be a manager. 
(R. at 0127.) 
Freeman also testified that she believed that the customer she 
saw talking to the manager was the same person who had caused the 
spill and that she was also the person who had fallen and been 
injured. (R. at 0126-0125.) Freeman saw this woman only when the 
woman was standing and talking to the manager. (R. at 0125.) 
Freeman did not see her in any other position. (R. at 0125.) 
Freeman testified that, once she approached the manager and the 
woman, she saw a dripping bottle in the woman's shopping basket. 
(R. at 0123.) 
The Wal-Mart manager who spoke with Plaintiff immediately 
after she fell was Troy Guevara, who testified as follows in the 
deposition pages attached to Defendant's Trial Memoranda. Guevara 
stated that the liquid on which the Plaintiff fell had come from a 
bottle which had been placed in a shopping cart by a customer who 
left a trail of liquid all through the store. (R. at 0147.) 
Guevara testified as follows: 
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A. Well, I remember later, whoever it was that 
came up said, "Troy, I followed that thing all the way 
around the store." 
Q. Okay. 
A. And I said, "Wow, that's a pretty good spill." 
(R. at 0145.) Guevara also testified that the spill was located in 
areas which Wal-Mart employees cross over "every five minutes or 
so." (R. at 0143.) He testified that he would have expected the 
employees to see the spill when they crossed the areas in which it 
was located. (R. at 0143.) 
Taken together and without considering any other evidence, the 
testimony contained in the deposition pages attached to the 
Defendant's Trial Memoranda establishes that the spill on which 
Plaintiff fell extended from the area in which Freeman worked to 
the front of the store near the checkout stands. Freeman testified 
that the spill extended for "quite a ways" through a high traffic 
area. Nevertheless, Freeman apparently discovered the spill solely 
by accident. No other Wal-Mart employee had noticed the spill or, 
if they had seen it, taken any efforts to clean it up. 
Boiled down, Wal-Mart's Motion for Summary Judgment was based 
on a single argument, namely, that it did not have actual or 
constructive knowledge of the spilled detergent in time to clean up 
the spill before Plaintiff fell. (See R. at 0096, 0094.) The 
evidence upon which Wal-Mart relied for this argument was, when 
construed according to Wal-Mart's interpretation, that the Wal-Mart 
employee who cleaned up the spill did not know of the spill until 
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after the Plaintiff had fallen. (See R. at 0096, 0094.) Wal-Mart 
itself summarized its argument as follows: 
Under this scenario, there is no way that Ms. Freeman 
could have cleaned the spill before Plaintiff's fall 
because she simply didn't observe the spill until after 
the fall occurred. 
(R. at 0094.) 
Wal-Mart's argument misses the point: the time at which it, 
through one of its employees, found the spill is irrelevant. The 
critical point is the one at which Wal-Mart should have discovered 
the dangerous condition. A property owner will be held liable for 
injuries caused by a dangerous condition on his property when he 
knew or should have known of the condition. See Koer v. Mayfair 
Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967); Canfield v. 
Albertsons, Inc.; Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). Here, Freeman located the customer that 
caused the spill in the front of the store. Plaintiff fell in the 
front of the store. Wal-Mart employees could have and should have 
noticed the spill before the customer managed to walk the entire 
length of the store. The law imposes liability on property owners 
not only for injuries caused by dangerous conditions of which they 
knew, but also for such conditions of which they should have known. 
Plaintiff contends that the evidence contained in the 
deposition pages attached to the Defendant's Trial Memoranda and 
the reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom establish 
that Wal-Mart had sufficient constructive notice of the spilled 
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detergent on which Plaintiff fell for it to be held liable for her 
injuries2. 
The jury's evaluation of Freeman's credibility is critical to 
this case. Freeman testified based on the assumption that the 
woman she saw speaking to the store manager was both the victim of 
the fall and the person who had spilled the liquid detergent. 
Freeman apparently based her assumption solely on her belief that 
something bad had to have happened for a manager to be talking to 
a customer. A jury may be particularly persuaded by the fact that 
Freeman readily admitted that she found the necessity of assisting 
customers to be a distraction and that she sometimes removed her 
smock, which identified her as a Wal-Mart employee, in order to 
avoid having to interact with customers. The jury might infer that 
2Freeman's description of the woman she saw at the front of the store was not Dee 
Blain. Therefore, Dee Blain fell either before Freeman approached this customer or 
after Freeman returned to her department after she fell. Plaintiff testified she was on 
the floor for 10 to 15 minutes. If Plaintiff fell before Freeman ran into the customer 
that caused the spill, and Freeman did not see Plaintiff while cleaning up the spill, it can 
be confirmed the spill was on the floor for some time. 
If Plaintiff fell after Freeman seemingly cleaned up the spill and went back to her 
department, Freeman acted negligently in failing to properly clean the spill. 
If a jury were to find that the woman Freeman saw was the plaintiff, then some time 
passed between plaintiffs fall and Freeman arriving at the scene. Plaintiff said she was 
on the floor for 10 to 15 minutes. Freeman said the woman she saw was standing 
talking to the manager. 
The manager admitted that, because of the location of the spill, the store's employees 
should have discovered it within five minutes. Nevertheless, Freeman claims she 
constantly followed the trail of soap but did not arrive at the place where she allegedly 
saw Dee Blain while the plaintiff was sitting on the floor. 
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Freeman also avoided other aspects of her job, such as looking for 
safety hazards and promptly cleaning up spills which she did see 
that presented dangers to customers. The jury might also find that 
the absence of Freeman's smock on the day in question could have 
prevented a customer from reporting the spill to her before she 
discovered it. These possibilities are obviously inferences from 
the depositions, but they illustrate the importance of having a 
jury determine questions of negligence. See generally Silcox v. 
Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc. In short, a jury should be permitted to 
determine whether Blain fell before Freeman saw the woman who had 
caused the spill talking to Guevara. Furthermore, a jury should be 
permitted to determine whether Freeman found and cleaned the spill 
improperly. A jury could also find that another Wal-Mart employee 
should have found and eliminated the spill before Freeman did. In 
other words, a jury should be permitted to determine whether the 
negligence of Wal-Mart's employees in failing to find and eliminate 
the spill in a timely manner caused Plaintiff's fall and injuries. 
Freeman's testimony does not in any way establish the amount 
of time which elapsed between the time she discovered the spill and 
the time the Plaintiff fell. Even more importantly, however, the 
time at which the spill was actually discovered is not 
determinative of the Defendant's liability. Defendant's manager 
stated that his employees should have discovered the spill within 
five minutes. Plaintiff was on the floor, at the terminal point of 
the spill, for up to 15 minutes. During that time, no Wal-Mart 
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employee discovered the spill and attempted to clean it up. Thus, 
the testimony of Defendant's own manager establishes, at the very 
least, that a jury question was stated regarding the negligence of 
the Defendant in failing to promptly find and correct the dangerous 
condition. 
Even if only the deposition testimony contained in the pages 
which were provided to the trial court by the Defendant are 
considered, it is clear that a genuine question of material fact 
regarding the Defendant's negligence is presented. 
Plaintiff has a right to a jury hearing the facts and 
testimonies of the parties. This is not a case where such right 
should be taken from the Plaintiff in a summary judgment process. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
FAILING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION UNDER UTAH 
R. CIV. P. 60(B). PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO 
ATTACH COPIES OF DEPOSITION PAGES ON WHICH SHE 
RELIED WAS BASED ON A REASONABLE READING OF 
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF CONTROLLING UTAH 
AUTHORITY AND BECAUSE THE ABSENCE OF THE 
COPIES DID NOT IN ANY WAY PREJUDICE THE 
DEFENDANT. 
This court reviews a trial court's denial of a motion under 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) for an abuse of discretion. See Larsen v. 
Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984). The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed the showing which must be 
made in order to show an abuse of discretion under the 
corresponding federal -rule in Blois v. Friday, 612 F.2d 938 (5th 
Cir. 1980). That court stated: 
Plaintiff's Rule 60(b) Motion must be equitably and 
liberally applied to achieve substantial justice. Doubt 
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should be resolved in favor of a judicial decision on the 
merits of a case, and a technical error or a slight 
mistake by plaintiff's attorney should not deprive 
plaintiff of an opportunity to present the true merits of 
his claims. The countervailing factors are the 
defendants' and society's interests in the finality of 
judgments and the avoidance of prejudice. Roberts v. 
Rehoboth Pharmacy, Inc., supra, 574 F.2d at 847-48; 
Fackelman v. Bell, 564 F.2d 734, 735-36 (5th Cir. 1977). 
The plaintiff should not be punished for his attorney's 
mistake absent a clear record of delay, willful contempt 
or contumacious conduct. 
Id. at 940. 
The facts in Blois showed that the plaintiff's attorney in 
that case neglected to inform the court of a new address for his 
office. The Defendant's motion for summary judgment was mailed to 
the old address, and the plaintiff's attorney did not receive it 
until the time to file an answer had passed. The court granted a 
default summary judgment upon the plaintiff's failure to file an 
answer within the specified time. The plaintiff then sought relief 
under Rule 60(b). After making the comments quoted above, the 
trial court further stated 
The appellate record and the parties' briefs in this 
case indicate no prejudice from the short delay in filing 
plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment and the 
accompanying memorandum in response to the defendants' 
motion for summary judgment. The events leading up to 
this failure by. plaintiff's attorney to file a timely 
answer also do not show any willful misconduct or other 
extreme or unusual circumstances. Hassenflu v. Pyke, 
supra, 491 F.2d at 1095 and n.3. Plaintiff's attorney 
merely neglected to file a notice of his change of 
address with the district court. This neglect, and the 
untimely forwarding of the copy of the defendants' motion 
for summary judgment from the old address of plaintiff's 
attorney combined to deprive plaintiff of a judicial 
decision on the merits. We do not condone the neglect 
of plaintiff's counsel. The plaintiff, however, should 
not have to pay with the loss of his cause of action for 
his attorney's minor mistake without clear proof of 
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serious misconduct and prejudice. Neither exists in this 
case. 
Thus, the district court abused its discretion by 
refusing to vacate its final entry of default summary 
judgment. 
Id. 
Plaintiff contends, as has been discussed in detail above, 
that she was not required by Utah law to attach copies of the 
deposition pages on which she relied to her Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Briefly 
restated, Plaintiff, through her attorney, relied on Utah R. Jud. 
Admin. 4-501(A) in citing to the appropriate pages of the 
depositions. She was, and continues to be, unaware of any 
authority contradicting that rule and requiring that copies of 
deposition pages be attached to the document she presented to the 
court. Even if this court now holds that the copies should have 
been attached, Plaintiff asks the court to recognize that her 
interpretation of Utah law was completely reasonable, and, thus, a 
finding by the trial court of "willful misconduct or other extreme 
or unusual circumstances" was precluded. 
Furthermore, there was absolutely no prejudice to the 
Defendant from the absence of copies of the depositions. Indeed, 
the Defendant did not even object to the absence of the copies in 
the trial court. Finally, it should be remembered that the trial 
judge failed to consider the evidence contained in the deposition 
pages cited by Defendant, copies of which were attached to the 
Defendant's Trial Memoranda. The trial judge's failure to consider 
this evidence suggests that he may have acted in haste in ruling, 
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sua sponte, that he would not consider Plaintiff's argument because 
he did not have copies of the deposition pages to which Plaintiff 
cited. Plaintiff asks this court to rule that in the absence of a 
showing of willful misconduct by the moving party and prejudice to 
the opposing party the trial judge's refusal to grant Plaintiff's 
motion under Rule 60(b) was an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff/Appellant Dee 
Blain requests that this court REVERSE the summary judgment entered 
by the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
G\7Steven Sullivan, Esquire 
RobertyJ. DeBry & Associates 
4252 South W O East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
(801) 262-8915 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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Memorandum Decision 
• Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DEE BLAIN, 
vs. 
WAL-MART STORES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 970400626 
DATE: February 8, 1999 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
LAW CLERK: DaveBackman 
This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Having received and considered the Motion, together with memoranda in support of and 
opposition to the Motion, the Court hereby grants the Motion and delivers the following 
Memorandum Decision. 
Statement of Facts 
Plaintiff was injured when she slipped and fell on a liquid detergent spill as she was 
approaching the cashier stands at the Wal-mart in Orem. Melia Lei O'Hawaii White Freeman, a 
Wal-mart department manager, testified in her deposition that she had been cleaning the spill for a 
minute or two when she turned a corner in an effort to continue to clean the spill trail and found 
Plaintiff standing and talking to Troy Guevera, a Wal-mart assistant manager, after the injury. 
Plaintiff testified in her deposition that she remained on the floor for ten to fifteen minutes after 
the M. 
Opinion of the Court 
Summary judgment is proper only if there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." URCP 56(c). The Court must 
view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 
855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). 
In a slip and fall caused by a temporary hazard, 
it is quite universally held that fault cannot be imputed to the 
defendant so that liability results therefrom unless two conditions 
are met: (A) that he had knowledge of the condition, that is, either 
actual knowledge or constructive knowledge because the condition 
had existed long enough that he should have discovered it; and (B) 
that after such knowledge, sufficient time elapsed that in the 
exercise of reasonable care he should have remedied it. 
Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets. 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996). 
The Court finds that there is no evidence that Defendant had knowledge of the liquid 
detergent spill until after Plaintiffs injury. There is also no evidence that the spill had existed for 
a long enough time that Defendant had constructive knowledge of it. Ms. Freeman testified in her 
deposition that she had been cleaning the spill for one to two minutes when she discovered 
Plaintiff standing and talking to assistant manager Guevera after the injury. Plaintiff testified in 
her deposition that she remained on the floor for ten to fifteen minutes after the fall. Since 
Plaintiff was standing when Ms. Freeman found her talking to Mr. Guevera, Defendant did not 
have knowledge of the spill until several minutes after the fall. 
Plaintiff argues that it is disputed whether Defendant had knowledge of the spill before 
her fall since she testified in her deposition that she was still lying on the floor when she talked to 
Mr. Guevera and because Ms. Freeman's description in her deposition of the person she found 
standing and talking to Mr. Guevera was obviously of another woman. However, the Court 
cannot consider these arguments since Plaintiff did not provide the Court with a copy of the 
portions of the depositions which allegedly contain these statements. 
[W]hen a party opposes a properly supported motion for summary 
judgment and fails to file any responsive affidavits or other 
evidentiary materials allowed by Rule 56(e), the trial court may 
properly conclude that there are no genuine issues of fact unless 
the face of the movant's affidavit affirmatively discloses the 
existence of such an issue. Without such a showing, the Court 
need only decide whether, on the basis of the applicable law, the 
2 
moving party is entitled to judgment. Franklin Financial v. New 
Empire Development Co.. 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983). 
Since Defendant's Motion and supporting portions of depositions do not afiBrmatively disclose the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact, the Court has no supporting factual basis for it to 
consider Plaintiffs arguments. 
Order 
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted. 
DATED this / day of February, 1999,
 N K 
cc: G. Steven Sullivan, Attorney for Plaintiff 
Stephen G. Morgan, Attorney for Defendant 
Mitchel T. Rice, Attorney for Defendant 
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